Senate Bill #413 (2017)

AN ACT RELATING TO ELECTIONS --POST-ELECTION AUDITS

Authorizes the board of elections to establish a post-election risk-limiting audit program to improve the accuracy of election results.

View latest version | View original version
View status on official RI website

Subscribe to email updates


Changes since original draft

  • 2017 – S 0413
  • 2017 – S 0413 SUBSTITUTE A
  • ========
  • LC001550
  • LC001550/SUB A
  • ========
  • S TATE OF RHODE IS L AND
  • IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
  • JANUARY SESSION, A.D. 2017
  • ____________
  • A N A C T
  • RELATING TO ELECTIONS –POST-ELECTION AUDITS
  • S T A T E O F R H O D E I S L A N D
  • IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
  • JANUARY SESSION, A.D. 2017
  • ____________
  • A N A C T
  • RELATING TO ELECTIONS –POST-ELECTION AUDITS
  • Introduced By: Senators Sheehan, Cote, Raptakis, DiPalma, and Kettle
  • Date Introduced: March 02, 2017
  • Referred To: Senate Judiciary
  • It is enacted by the GeneralAssembly as follows:
  • It is enacted by the General Assembly as follows:
  • SECTION 1. Chapter 17-19 of the General Laws entitled "Conduct of Election and Voting Equipment, and Supplies" is hereby amended by adding thereto the following section:
  • 17-19-37.4. Post-election audits.
  • (a) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that auditing of election results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and public confidence in the election results. Further, risk-limiting audits provide a more effective manner of conducting audits than traditional audit methods in that risk-limiting audit methods typically require only limited resources for election races with wide margins of victory while investing greater resources in close races.
  • (b) Commencing in 2018 the board is required to conduct risk-limiting audits after all primary, generaland specialelections in accordance with the requirements of this section.
  • (a) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that auditing of election results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and public confidence in the election results. Further, risk-limiting audits provide a more effective manner of conducting audits than traditional audit methods in that risk-limiting audit methods typically require only limited resources for election contests with wide margins of victory while investing greater resources in close contests.
  • (b) Commencing in 2018 the board in conjunction with local boards is authorized to conduct risk-limiting audits after all statewide primary, general and special elections in accordance with the requirements of this section. Commencing in 2020 the state board in conjunction with local boards must conduct risk-limiting audits after the presidential preference primary, and general elections in accordance with requirements in this section.
  • (c) The audit program shall be conducted as follows:
  • (1) The board shall determine what local, multijurisdictional, statewide and federal contests are subject to a risk-limiting audit;
  • (2) The board shall provide at least a five (5) day public notice of the time and place of the random selection of the audit units to be manually tallied and of the times and places of the audit;
  • (3) The board shall make available to the public a report of the vote tabulating device results for the contest, including the results for each audit unit in the contest, prior to the random selection of audit units to be manually tallied and prior to the commencement of the audit;
  • (4) The state board in conjunction with the local boards shall conduct the audit upon tabulation of the unofficial final results as provided in §§17-19-36 and 17-19-37 and complete the audit within seven (7) days after the election; and
  • (5) The board in conjunction with the local boards shall conduct the audit in public view by hand without the use of electronic scanning equipment according to rules established by the state board.
  • (1) The state board shall determine what local, statewide and federal contests are subject to a risk-limiting audit;
  • (2) The state board shall provide notice pursuant of chapter 46 of title 42 of the time and place of the random selection of the audit units to be manually tallied and of the times and places of the audits;
  • (3) The state board shall make available to the public a report of the vote tabulating device results for the contest, including the results for each audit unit in the contest, prior to the random selection of audit units to be manually tallied and prior to the commencement of the audit;
  • (4) The state board in conjunction with the local boards shall conduct the audit upon tabulation of the unofficial final results as provided in §§17-19-36 and 17-19-37; and
  • (5) The state board in conjunction with the local boards shall conduct the audit in public view by manually interpreting the ballots according to rules established by the state board in accordance with chapter 45 of title 42.
  • (d) If a risk-limiting audit of a contest leads to a full manual tally of the ballots cast using the voting system, the vote counts according to that manual tally shall replace the vote counts reported pursuant to §§17-19-36 and 17-19-3 7 for the purpose of determining the official contest results pursuant to §§17-22-5.2 and 17-22-6.
  • (e) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
  • (1) "Audit unit" means a precinct, a set of ballots, or a single ballot. A precinct, a set of ballots, or a single ballot may be used as an audit unit for purposes of this section only if allof the following conditions are satisfied:
  • (1) "Audit unit" means a precinct, a set of ballots, or a single ballot. A precinct, a set of ballots, or a single ballot may be used as an audit unit for purposes of this section only if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
  • (i) The relevant vote tabulating device is able to produce a report of the votes cast in the precinct, set of ballots, or single ballot.
  • (ii) The elections official is able to match the report described in subsection (i) of this section with the ballots corresponding to the report for purposes of conducting an audit pursuant to this section.
  • (iii) Each ballot is assigned to not more than one audit unit.
  • (ii) Each ballot is assigned to not more than one audit unit.
  • (2) "Contest" means an election for an office or for a measure.
  • (3) "Risk-limiting audit" means a manual tally employing a statistical method that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the vote tabulating device for the audited contest. A risk-limiting audit shall begin with a hand tally of the votes in one or more audit units and shall continue to hand tally votes in additional audit units until there is strong statistical evidence that the electoral outcome is correct. In the event that counting additional audit units does not provide strong statistical evidence that the electoral outcome is correct, the audit shall continue until there has been a full manual tally to determine the correct electoraloutcome of the audited contest.
  • (3) "Risk-limiting audit" means a manual tally employing a statistical method that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the vote tabulating system for the audited contest. A risk-limiting audit shall begin with a hand tally of the votes in one or more audit units and shall continue to hand tally votes in additional audit units until there is strong statistical evidence that the electoral outcome is correct. In the event that counting additional audit units does not provide strong statistical evidence that the electoral outcome is correct, the audit shall continue until there has been a full manual tally to determine the correct electoral outcome of the audited contest.
  • (4) "Unofficial final results" means election results tabulated pursuant §§17-19-36 and 17-19-37.
  • (f) The state board shall promulgate rules, regulations and procedures necessary to
  • LC001550 - Page 2of 4 implement this section.
  • SECTION 2. This act shalltake effect upon passage. ======== LC001550 ========
  • LC001550 - Page 3of 4
  • (f) The results of any audits conducted under this section shall be published on the website of the state board within forty-eight (48) hours of being accepted by the state board. If the audit involved a manual tally of one or more entire precincts, then the names and numbers of all precincts audited and a comparison of the vote tabulator results with the hand counts for each precinct shall be published with the audit results on the website.
  • (g) Any audit required under this section shall not commence for any election subject to a recount pursuant to §§17-19-37.1, 17-19-37.2, and 17-19-37.3 until the conclusion of said recount.
  • (h) The state board shall promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures in accordance with chapter 45 of title 42 necessary to implement this section.
  • SECTION 2. This act shall take effect upon passage.
  • ========
  • LC001550/SUB A
  • ========
  • EXPLANATION
  • BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
  • BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
  • OF
  • A N A C T
  • RELATING TO ELECTIONS –POST-ELECTION AUDITS
  • A N A C T
  • RELATING TO ELECTIONS –POST-ELECTION AUDITS
  • ***
  • This act would authorize the board of elections to establish a post-election risk-limiting audit program to improve the accuracy of election results.
  • This act would take effect upon passage. ======== LC001550 ========
  • LC001550 - Page 4of 4
  • This act would take effect upon passage. ======== LC001550/SUB A ========

Votes

NOTE: Electronic voting records are unofficial and may not be accurate. For an official vote tally, check the House or Senate Journal from the day of the vote.

Floor vote for POST-ELECTION AUDITS

June 29, 2017 at 9:56pm
Yeas: 36 / Nays: 0 / Not voting: 1 / Recused: 0
Legislator Vote
Sen. Algiere Y
Sen. Archambault Y
Sen. Calkin Y
Sen. Ciccone Y
Sen. Conley Y
Sen. Cote Y
Sen. Coyne Y
Sen. Crowley Y
Sen. DaPonte Y
Sen. DiPalma Y
Sen. Doyle NV
Sen. Felag Y
Sen. Fogarty Y
Sen. Gallo Y
Sen. Gee Y
Sen. Goldin Y
Sen. Goodwin Y
Sen. Jabour Y
Sen. Kettle Y
Sen. Lombardi Y
Sen. Lombardo Y
Sen. Lynch Prata Y
Sen. McCaffrey Y
Sen. Metts Y
Sen. Miller Y
Sen. Morgan Y
Sen. Nesselbush Y
Sen. Paolino Y
Sen. Pearson Y
Sen. Picard Y
Sen. Quezada Y
Sen. Raptakis Y
Sen. Ruggerio Y
Sen. Satchell Y
Sen. Seveney Y
Sen. Sheehan Y
Sen. Sosnowski Y

Floor vote for RELATING TO ELECTIONS --POST-ELE

September 19, 2017 at 8:45pm
Yeas: 63 / Nays: 0 / Not voting: 12 / Recused: 0
Legislator Vote
Rep. Abney Y
Rep. Ackerman Y
Rep. Ajello Y
Rep. Almeida Y
Rep. Amore NV
Rep. Azzinaro Y
Rep. Barros NV
Rep. Bennett Y
Rep. Blazejewski Y
Rep. Canario Y
Rep. Carson NV
Rep. Casey Y
Rep. Casimiro Y
Rep. Chippendale Y
Rep. Corvese Y
Rep. Costantino Y
Rep. Coughlin Y
Rep. Craven Y
Rep. Cunha Y
Rep. Diaz NV
Rep. Donovan Y
Rep. Edwards Y
Rep. Fellela Y
Rep. Filippi Y
Rep. Fogarty Y
Rep. Giarrusso Y
Rep. Handy Y
Rep. Hearn Y
Rep. Hull Y
Rep. Jacquard Y
Rep. Johnston Y
Rep. Kazarian Y
Rep. Keable Y
Rep. Kennedy Y
Rep. Knight Y
Rep. Lancia Y
Rep. Lima Y
Rep. Lombardi Y
Rep. Maldonado Y
Rep. Marshall Y
Rep. Marszalkowski Y
Rep. Mattiello Y
Rep. McEntee Y
Rep. McKiernan Y
Rep. McLaughlin NV
Rep. McNamara Y
Rep. Mendonca NV
Rep. Messier Y
Rep. Morgan Y
Rep. Morin Y
Rep. Nardolillo NV
Rep. Newberry Y
Rep. Nunes Y
Rep. O'Brien Y
Rep. O'Grady NV
Rep. Perez Y
Rep. Phillips Y
Rep. Price NV
Rep. Quattrocchi NV
Rep. Ranglin-Vassell NV
Rep. Regunberg Y
Rep. Roberts Y
Rep. Ruggiero Y
Rep. Serpa Y
Rep. Shanley Y
Rep. Shekarchi Y
Rep. Slater Y
Rep. Solomon Y
Rep. Tanzi Y
Rep. Tobon Y
Rep. Ucci Y
Rep. Vella-Wilkinson Y
Rep. Walsh NV
Rep. Williams Y
Rep. Winfield Y